How to Wreck the Economy

LESTER THUROW

LESTER THUROW

Professor of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and recent dean of the MIT Sloan School of Business, Thurow has three New York Times bestsellers to his credit. His new work by Harper Business Books is entitled Building Wealth: New Rules for Individuals, Companies and Countries in a Knowledge-based Economy.


This article is abridged from Speak Out Against the New Right edited by Herbert F. Vetter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1982)

President Johnson's refusal to raise taxes to pay for the Vietnam War is legitimately remembered as one of the key factors leading us into our current economic mess. He wanted both the Great Society and the war. But if he were to have both and not wreck the economy, his only option was to raise taxes sharply. He chose not to do so, and he wrecked the economy.

President Reagan wants both dramatic tax cuts to encourage investment and an even more extensive military build-up. But he cannot have both without wrecking the economy further unless he is willing to raise taxes dramatically on private consumption. He has chosen not to do so. If his current program is carried out, he too will wreck the economy.

Military spending is a form of consumption. It does not increase our ability to produce more goods and services in the future. While it may be necessary, it is consumption nonetheless. And as in any private budget, if you allocate more to one form of consumption, you must allocate less to some other form of consumption.

This means equivalent cuts must be made in other forms of consumption. The proposed military increase is so large that it cannot be fully paid for with cuts in civilian expenditures unless the president is willing to abolish major social programs such as Social Security. If he is not willing to do this, taxes must be raised to cut private consumption.

While President Reagan is only preparing for war and not actively engaging in one, the economic problems of military spending spring from the rapid production of weapons, not from their use. The capacity to produce capital goods and equipment, skilled manpower, and raw materials must all be quickly redirected to military production. In shifting both human and capital resources from civilian to military activities tremendous strains are placed on the domestic economy, unless measures are taken to restrain private consumption. Without tax increases the military can get only the necessary capital capacity, skilled manpower, and raw materials by paying more than the civilian economy is willing to pay. This drives up prices and creates civilian shortages.

As with President Johnson, the mistakes of President Reagan will only become obvious long after they have been made. By the time they are obvious, it will be too late to correct them. If the mistakes are to be corrected and the undesirable effects avoided, the correction must be made now—not two to three years from now.

If the Reagan administration were to carry out its current plans, it would have no rational alternative to a large tax increase on private consumption. If the administration is unwilling to raise taxes on private consumption, it will repeat the Vietnam experience. Initially output will rise and unemployment will fall. But eventually a sustained inflation will result from the economy’s inability to produce both the civilian and military goods that are being demanded of it.

A military build-up of the magnitude proposed by President Reagan almost demands that the U.S. insist that its military allies, who are also its economic competitors, engage in a similar military build-up. From the point of view of equity, the American taxpayer cannot be expected to accept a large reduction in his standard of living while taxpayers abroad continue to improve their standards of living. But even more importantly, America cannot afford to destroy the competitive strength of its none-too-strong domestic economy. If the skilled workers and funds that are used for defense here are used for civilian production abroad, it should not come as a great surprise if we are driven out of civilian markets. What will happen to the United States if the industries that manufacture semiconductors, micro-processors, and computers are forced out of business while the nation is busy rearming itself? What good does it do us to dominate the world in missile production if we are at the same time being defeated in toasters? In the long run, a civilian economy that consistently fails in competition abroad will be unable to produce missiles for an effective military economy.

This explosion in output is predicted for an economy where growth in productivity has been gradually slowing down since 1965 and has in fact been negative during the last three years. The Reagan administration assumes that productivity is going to return to a 3 percent rate of growth almost instantly, but what will make this happen? Such an increase in productivity has never happened before in our history, and there are good technical reasons for believing that it will not happen now.

But in planning a major military build-up, a wise economic general does not argue about whether there will, or will not, be a dramatic rebound in the growth of productivity. He plans such a rapid increase on the conservative assumption that there will not be a sharp change in productivity and hopes to be pleasantly surprised if productivity does in fact dramatically improve. No permanent damage occurs if he plans for slow productivity and finds that productivity is actually growing rapidly. He can always easily cut taxes if the economy has extra unused productive capacity. But if he plans for rapid growth in productivity and it does not occur, the economic damage will be great. Taxes can be raised later on, but as the Vietnam War demonstrated, a tax increase in 1969 does not substitute for a tax increase that should have occurred in 1965.

There is, however, one major economic problem with the proposed cuts in expenditures. Most of the cuts focus on the working poor—essentially the group that is above the poverty line but within $3,000 of it. This group is going to be faced with a choice. The Reagan administration assumes that a cut in the social welfare benefits for the working poor will force them to work more. It is more likely that it will encourage them to work less to regain eligibility for the programs that they have just lost.

Suppose you are one of the working poor and have a sick child. One choice is to work harder—perhaps by taking a second job—in order to pay the necessary medical bills. Another is to quit working to make yourself eligible for Medicaid. To pose the choices is to give the likely answer. If the second choice prevails, the remaining social welfare programs will have to expand and will cost more than expected. The cuts in the civilian budget will therefore be smaller than the ones now projected. The result will be that the grave strains imposed on the economy by Reagan's military build-up will become graver still. The dangers of this budget are such that I can think of no priority higher for the nation's economic welfare than close and skeptical scrutiny of all new military expenditures to determine whether they are really needed.

Market Crash Born of Greed

LESTER THUROW

From the Boston Globe, April 17, 2001

Every economic system comes with its own genetic characteristics. Stock market crashes, booms and busts, inflation and deflation are all genetically part of capitalism. There are other social economic systems that come without these intrinsic instabilities. In communism there is no stock market to crash and central planning prevents ups and downs in either prices or output.

While these alternatives—socialism, cooperatives, kibbutzes—do not have capitalism's "bad" genes, they also do not have its "good" genes.

Capitalism has come to dominate the world's economies since no other system has been able to generate long-term economic growth in the two hundred years since the onset of the industrial revolution. Many others have been tried, but they have all failed.

Capitalism's bad genes cannot be separated from its good genes since both flow from the fact that capitalism taps into the greed that seems to be built into human beings. The desire to have "more," however much one already has, is the human desire that makes capitalism work. It leads us to acquire the skills that will earn us the most money, to work long hours, and to be ruthless profit maximizers.

The alternatives to capitalism all tried to tap into altruism. It is more important to help one's neighbor or the society in general than it is to help one's self. This is a much nicer ethical principle than the greed that underlies capitalism, but it unfortunately does not seem to be congruent with the way human beings are constructed. No one has been able to construct a society where communal altruism dominates individual need.

But it is also greed that leads to stock market crashes. Go back to the first capitalist stock market crash—tulip mania in Holland in the 1800s. At the peak of the boom four black tulip bulbs bought one of those nice row houses along the canals in Amsterdam. At the time everyone knew that was crazy. In the long run, the price of a tulip bulb cannot be higher than the cost of growing a tulip bulb. But there was a time when eight tulip bulbs bought a house. If an investor got out of the market when it was eight to one, when it was going to peak at four to one, he or she missed an opportunity to multiply their wealth by a factor of two. Who would want to pass up such an opportunity?

What was true in the 17th century is equally true in the 21st century. The high tech stock market crash now underway is not hard to explain. What were obviously overpriced high tech stocks had to come down to reality. What has to be explained is not the fall in prices but how the stock market prices of companies with no revenues, no profits, and no business model could have been so high a year ago. And the answer is greed. We all knew that these stocks were overpriced, but we all wanted to get wealthy. We knew that prices would eventually fall, but we believed that we could get out before the declines began. But as a group we cannot all get out of the market at the same time. Someone has to be left holding the bag. Greed overwhelmed rationality.

If greed is the primary factor leading to stock market crashes, there is also a secondary set of genetic characteristics that makes the crashes much bigger than what greed alone would do. This is the "herd" mentality. When a few of us start to run for the exits, we all start to run. We don't think, we run. And when we all run, prices don't return back to normal. They crash right through normal to abnormally low levels. Stocks with good revenues, profits and business models crash right along with those that have none of these characteristics.

We run as a herd because we have been genetically selected to do so. If a herd of antelope sees a lion, thousands run, even though only one of them will be eaten. No one wants to sacrifice itself and be that one antelope that will be eaten. If there were such an animal, the rest of us would not have to run. Antelope also run if they see the grass waving in the wind or if they see other antelope running. There may be a lion. One can always come back to eat the grass if the lion isn't really there. The one who waits to see if the lion really is there gets eaten. Over millions of years we have been genetically programmed to run as a herd. It is always rational to run.

Just as eventually a herd of antelope will settle down to eating grass, so eventually the stock market will return to normal. The prices of good companies will recover and bad companies will go out of business. All the investor has to do is to decide which are the good companies and which are the bad companies. Two or three of those dot.coms are going to be the Walmarts, General Electrics, and Merrill Lynches of tomorrow. If you buy those few, you really are going to get rich.


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